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Networking Entrepreneurs

讲座信息

主讲人

Fernando Vega-Redondo教授

香港中文大学

日期和时间

2026年3月2日（周一）

10:30-12:00

地点

综合教学楼D904会议室

讲座概述

Can peer interaction foster entrepreneurship in large-scale environments? We first address this question empirically through a pan-African RCT involving nearly 5,000 entrepreneurs from 49 countries where treated subjects interacted either in-person or virtually. Our analysis reveals a trade-off between interaction “bandwidth” and scalability, which is effectively addressed only if virtual interaction operates under significant but moderate peer diversity. Network-based peer effects are, however, estimated positive in all virtual arms. To explain this counterintuitive contrast, we develop a theory, supported by the evidence, that differentiates constructive from disruptive influence and also structurally identifies when scalable (hence impactful) interaction is fruitful.

主讲人简介

Fernando Vega-Redondo教授

香港中文大学

Fernando Vega-Redondo 教授现任香港中文大学经济学教授。他的研究主要聚焦于博弈论及其在社会经济领域中的应用，尤其关注社会网络、学习机制与演化过程相互作用下战略行为的形成与演变。Vega-Redondo 教授已在经济学、博弈论、生物学和物理学等领域的顶级学术期刊发表论文一百余篇，研究成果亦发表于《Science》《Nature Human Behavior》 和 《PNAS》 等国际权威期刊。他先后当选为计量经济学会、博弈论学会以及经济理论促进学会会士。

专利披露与资本市场反馈：来自 AIPA 的证据

Patent Disclosures and Capital Market Feedback: Evidence from AIPA

讲座信息

主讲人

Tim Martens

博科尼大学

日期和时间

2026年3月6日（周五）

10:30-12:00

地点

 102会议室, 会议楼 Ⅱ

讲座概述

We examine how patent disclosures affect managerial learning. Exploiting the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) as a shock that accelerated disclosure, we document an increase in investment-Q sensitivity among firms that revealed information more quickly after AIPA’s introduction. This effect is more pronounced for firms with lower analysts coverage, higher bid–ask spreads, and lower turnover suggesting that the effect is concentrated among firms where incremental price informativeness is most valuable. Additional evidence indicates that informed trading increases following pre-grant disclosures, suggesting that sophisticated investors incorporate the newly available technical information into prices. The findings suggest that AIPA enhanced capital market feedback, thereby shaping managerial decision-making.

主讲人简介

Tim Martens

博科尼大学

Tim Martens 获得曼海姆大学经济学学士学位、阿姆斯特丹大学经济学硕士学位，以及曼海姆大学会计学博士学位。在攻读博士期间，他曾作为访问博士生在蒂尔堡大学和哥伦比亚大学交流。在加入博科尼大学之前，他曾在贝叶斯商学院担任会计学助理教授。他的文章发表在《会计研究评论》（Review of Accounting Studies）以及《会计研究期刊》（Journal of Accounting Research）上。

政府风险投资：挤入还是挤出？

Government Venture Capital: Crowding-in or crowding-out?

讲座信息

主讲人

Vincenzo Quadrini教授

南加州大学

日期和时间

2026年3月6日（周五）

10:30-12:00

地点

综合教学楼D804会议室

讲座概述

We study how government venture capital (GVC) investment affects the financial and investment decisions of funded firms using firm-level data from a large commercial bank in China. We find that GVC funding is associated with higher bank borrowing and real investment for funded firms (crowding in rather than crowding out). We do not find the same results for private venture capital (PVC) investment. Another finding is that GVC investments spill over to firms that do not receive venture capital investment but are connected to the funded firms through their supply chain network.

主讲人简介

Vincenzo Quadrini教授

南加州大学

Vincenzo Quadrini现任南加州大学金融学与商业经济学教授，并担任工商管理詹姆斯·麦克纳尔·斯坦希尔讲席教授。他的研究领域主要包括国际经济学、创业经济学以及金融契约，其研究成果发表于《American Economic Review》《Journal of Political Economy》《Review of Economic Studies》 等国际知名学术期刊。

他现任《American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics》 联合主编，曾担任 《Review of Economic Dynamics》 协调主编，并为 Center for Economic Policy Research 的研究员。加入南加州大学之前，Quadrini教授曾在纽约大学、杜克大学以及庞培法布拉大学任教。

知情的代价: 市场出清中的竞争与搜索摩擦

The Cost of Knowing: Competition and Search Frictions in Market Clearing

讲座信息

主讲人

谢颖康教授

圣路易斯华盛顿大学

日期和时间

2026年3月6日（周五）

10:30-12:00

地点

综合教学楼D504会议室

讲座概述

Making information available is often expected to facilitate market clearing. We test this hypothesis using a field experiment on a digital shipping platform by randomizing whether truck drivers observe the current best rival bid when competing for shipment jobs. Revealing competitor prices intensifies price competition. Shipment jobs are more likely to clear either at the posted take-it-now price or at lower negotiated prices. However, contrary to standard efficiency intuition, intensified competition does not increase the volume of successful matches when price drops, but rather slows down the overall market clearing. Drivers are more likely to click away from jobs to avoid competition rather than being nudged to use take-it-now to secure a job. Instead, they reallocate their effort from negotiation toward extensive search, effectively substituting haggling for checking alternative job opportunities. Drivers expand their consideration sets substantially, but matches are not only delayed but cancelled more often. Further analysis reveals a boundary condition that information backfires only when driver supply far exceeds demand; conversely, in less congested markets, showing real-time competition improves job coordination. Our results show that making information available does not necessarily accelerate market clearing: although transparency can reduce bargaining frictions in price discovery, it also induces costly search that offsets its intended efficiency gains.

主讲人简介

谢颖康教授

圣路易斯华盛顿大学

谢教授的研究聚焦于平台在定价、信息披露、以及渠道管理方面所面临的挑战。他于 2023 年获得西北大学凯洛格管理学院市场营销学博士学位，并在市场营销期刊 《Journal of Marketing Research 》发表论文。其研究成果曾荣获美国统计学会（American Statistical Association）颁发的2023年博士研究奖最佳论文奖。谢教授此前曾是 Credit Karma首位数据科学家，负责从零开始搭建类拍卖的广告投放系统。他还曾在 Adobe 和 Facebook 工作，参与多个与数字营销中广告主行为及广告效果相关的项目。